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In a life-span perspective, Baglio and Marchetti make the hypothesis of “the existence of multiple
kinds of Theory of Mind” and urge the transition from a discrete to a dimensional approach in
the study of mentalization (“ToM may vary along a quantitative and a qualitative continuum”).
We resist such a plea and argue that we can stick to a discrete approach which posits just a single
early-developing mindreading system, and then works out a “third-person first” perspective on
mentalization, according to which the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes
and grounds the understanding of our own minds. In this third-person first framework, Baglio
and Marchetti’s claim that mentalization is “a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence—
and be influenced by—a manifold of psychosocial aspects” is reformulated as follows: first-person
mentalization evolves in an interplay of third-person mentalization, autobiographical memory and
socio-communicative skills attuned by cultural variables. Let us examine these points one by one.
In the first place, we take a nativist-modularist perspective on third-person mentalization
(henceforth “mindreading”). After Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) groundbreaking paper, enough
evidence has accumulated to endorse the hypothesis that a form of primary mindreading is not a
developmental achievement, but an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation (Baillargeon
et al., 2013, 2014). Such adaptation is implemented by a mechanism computing a body of
knowledge specific to the domain of naïve psychology, which comes online during the first year of
age (Carruthers, 2013). Such early-developing domain-specific mindreadingmechanism underpins
basic mentalistic abilities (including the metarepresentational capacity to pass spontaneous-
response false belief tests) which are to be distinguished from the full range of mature activities that
may employ such skills. During the development these basic mindreading abilities “may eventually
be recruited by higher cognitive processes for more complex tasks,” thus higher-order mentalistic
activities may emerge, which “may well interact (in a non-modular way) with other cognitive
processes, and may not be uniform across individuals or cultures” (Scholl and Leslie, 1999, p. 140).
The focus on the neurocognitive bases of mentalizing abilities, therefore, does not rule out the
influence of socio-cultural variables.
In the second place, we take a cognitive-constructivist stance on the debate on first-person
mentalization (henceforth “introspection”). The argument for this claim builds on Carruthers’
(2011) Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge,
which is a strong case for the claim that mindreading has a functional and evolutionary priority
over introspection. According to the ISA account, although we can have non-interpretive access to
our own sensory and affective states, the self-attribution of propositional attitude states is always a
process of self-interpretation that exploits the same sensory channels that we utilize when working
out other people’s mental states.
Carruthers’s theory of introspective self-knowledge, however, does not predict that mindreading
is also developmentally prior to introspection (Carruthers, 2009b, p. 167). By contrast, we make just
such a claim.
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In an attempt to explain why we have the (false) intuition that
there is introspection for our thoughts, Carruthers takes very
seriously Wilson’s (2002) hypothesis that the self-transparency
assumption “may make it easier for subjects to engage in
various kinds of adaptive self-deception, helping them build and
maintain a positive self-image” (Carruthers, 2009a, p. 138, n. 5).
Moreover, in looking at the possibility that the emergence of
introspection is a by-product of the evolution of mindreading,
Carruthers considers such possibility as compatible with the
hypothesis that introspection “might have come under secondary
selection thereafter, perhaps by virtue of helping to build
and maintain a positive self-image, as Wilson [. . . ] suggests”
(Carruthers, 2009a, p. 128).
Thus, here Carruthers is opening the door to the topic of
defense mechanisms. Moreover, the ISA theory heavily draws
on the confabulation data from the huge cognitive dissonance
and causal attribution literatures (2011, chap. 11), and such
data—we believe—can hardly be separated from the topic of
the construction and maintenance of “a positive self-image.”
There is a problem, though. Carruthers’ (2011) focus is on
introspection construed as knowledge of one’s own current
mental states; and this knowledge “is arguably more fundamental
than knowledge of oneself as a self with an ongoing mental life”
(Carruthers et al., 2012, p. 14; italics added). Now, insofar as
Carruthers takes introspection merely as a competence to self-
attribute one’s own current mental states, Wilson’s hypothesis
of the self-defensive nature of introspection cannot be built
into the ISA theory. For the topic of defenses makes sense
only in the context of the construction and protection of the
psychological self-consciousness or subjective identity (“a self
with an ongoing mental life”). But once introspection is seen in
this context it becomes possible to make the hypothesis that it
develops through the act of turning on oneself the competence
to mind-read others; and that this occurs through that socio-
communicative interaction with caregivers (and successively
other social partners) investigated in attachment theory research
[this seems to be what is at stake in Fernyhough’s (2009) and
Hernik et al.’s (2009) commentaries on Carruthers (2009a)].
As regards attachment theory, it is to be noticed that it
builds within a contextualist and systemic framework, where
(individual) biology and (social) relationality go hand in hand.
Individuals are pre-wired to the interpersonal relationship from
the birth, and mindreading is integral to such pre-organization.
It makes perfect sense, therefore, that the early-developing core
mindreading system is an innate social-cognitive adaptation
that is independent of the attachment system (Gergely and
Unoka, 2008). This leads us to reject the hypothesis, variously
put forward by a number of attachment theorists and infant
researchers, that there is an inherent causal and functional link
between the quality of early infant attachment on the one hand,
and the development of mindreading on the other.
When we take into consideration introspection, in contrast,
the child’s socio-communicative interaction with caregivers is
constitutively involved in the construction of the virtual inner
space of the mind—an introspective (as opposed to bodily) form
of self-consciousness that then evolves as narrative identity. The
development of introspection is therefore an outward-in process
through which a subject constructs itself as psychologically
self-conscious (and not only as physically self-conscious) in
an interplay of metarepresentational abilities, autobiographical
memory, and socio-communicative capacities modulated by
socio-cultural variables. The young child who turned her
mindreading abilities upon herself under the thrust of caregivers’
mind-minded talk, by the end of the preschool years begins to
grasp her introspective self-description as rationalized in terms
of autobiography (Fivush, 2011).
This process of narrative self-construction is inseparably
cognitive and affective in nature. Attachment theory and infant
research have shown that affective growth and construction of
identity cannot be separated. The description of the self that from
2 to 3 years of age the child keenly pursues is an “accepting
description,” i.e., a description that is indissolubly cognitive (as
definition of self) and emotional-affectional (as acceptance of
self). Briefly, the child needs a clear and consistent capacity to
describe itself, fully legitimized by the caregiver and socially valid.
Accordingly, one cannot ascribe concreteness and solidity to
one’s own self-consciousness if the latter does not possess, at its
core, a description of identity that must be clear and, indissolubly,
“good” as worthy of being loved.
The incessant construction and reconstruction of an
acceptable and adaptively functioning identity is therefore the
process through which our intra- and inter-personal balances are
produced, and hence a foundation of psychological well-being
and mental health. This finds illustration in the developmental
psychopathology of attachment, according to which the abusive
or seriously neglective behaviors of the attachment figures may
give rise to disturbances in identity.
“Identity” is a central diagnostic criterion for personality
disorders in DSM-5. Here we will look briefly at Borderline
Personality Disorder (BPD), this being a clinical condition that—
as Hernik et al. (2009) suggest—“may become an important
source of new data that could illuminate relationships between
mindreading and self-awareness and their developmental
antecedents” (p. 148).
In the first place, the majority of the studies that investigated
the ability of BPD patients to mind-read other people found
an equal or superior mindreading ability in BPD. In Franzen
et al.’s (2011) economic exchange game experiment, for example,
patients with BPD had to recognize fair or unfair attitudes
and deception through emotional cues from facial expressions
of others, attributing mental states in the interaction with
social partners. They turned out to perform better than healthy
controls. This makes perfect sense when mindreading is analyzed
in the context of the attachment history of the patients with BPD.
In Franzen et al.’s (2011) virtual trust game participants must
recognize others’ intentions in a situation in which the other
person could not be cooperative and/or could potentially hurt.
BPD patients have been highly trained to mind-read, being their
relationship with caregivers characterized by the need to protect
themselves by means of an anticipation of neglectful or abusive
behaviors, learning to read signals of threat or rejection (Linehan,
1995).
Second, BPD patients’ impairments in mentalization cannot
be conceptualized independently from their difficulties with
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autobiographical memory. Let us consider Preißler et al.’s (2010)
study, where patients with BPD were asked to perform two
higher-order mentalization tasks—Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001)
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” (RME) task; and the “Movie
for the Assessment of Social Cognition” (MASC: Dziobek et al.,
2006), a more ecologically valid task in which participants
are required to attribute mental states to movie characters in
an everyday life-relevant context. BPD patients’ performance
on the RME did not show any impairments in mentalization
compared to non-clinical controls. In the MASC, in contrast,
PTSD intrusive symptomatology in the BPD group played an
important role in the emergence of disturbed recognition of the
feelings, thoughts, and intentions of the movie characters.
This is well in line with Dziobek et al.’s (2011) study, which
used an fMRI adaptation of the Multifaceted Empathy Test. A
region comprising the left superior temporal sulcus and gyrus
(STS/STG) seems to play a role in higher-order mentalizing tasks
such as those mentioned above (see, e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003). Now, Dziobek et al. found a reduced activation of the
STS/STG region in BPD patients who reported high levels of
recurring traumatic memories.
This leads us to a third point. The caregiver’s neglect of a
child’s emotional responses is assumed to play a central role in the
etiology of BPD (Lyons-Ruth et al., 2005). On the one hand, the
absence of empathic affect-regulative-mirroring interactions may
prevent the child from creating “the necessary mappings between
the emerging causal representations of emotional states in others
and emerging distinct emotional self-states,” which in turn
may give rise to “compromised second-order representations of
self-states” (Hernik et al., 2009, p. 148). On the other hand,
BPD individuals’ need to implement strategies to cope with the
deficit in affect self-regulationmay contribute to the disruption of
autobiographical memory (see, e.g., Van den Broeck et al., 2012,
2015). In BPD patients, then, an interplay of impairments in
first-person mentalization and autobiographical memory occurs,
which disrupts the development of “autobiographical reasoning.”
This is the ability to create relations between different parts
of one’s past, present, and future life and one’s personality and
development; by so doing, it embeds personal memories in a
culturally, temporally, causally, and thematically coherent life
story, thus offering ways of establishing and re-establishing
the diachronic continuity of the self (Habermas, 2011). The
impairment of autobiographical reasoning, therefore, leads to
identity disturbance—a “markedly and persistently unstable self-
image or sense of self ” (APA, 2013, p. 664)—which has long been
considered one of the defining features of BPD (see, e.g., Adler
et al., 2012; Jørgensen et al., 2012).
In summary, we maintained that first-person
mentalization/introspection is not simply a matter of self-
attributing one’s own current mental states; it is rather
a higher-order mentalistic activity that gives shape to a
psychological (as opposed to bodily) form of self-consciousness.
Furthermore, introspection cannot be singled out from the
context of that construction and defense of subjective identity
that is the key to the developmental psychopathology of
attachment. This was illustrated by the inextricable interweaving
of mentalization, autobiographical reasoning, and identity
disturbance in BPD patients.
References
Adler, J. M., Chin, E. D., Kolisetty, A. P., and Oltmanns, T. F. (2012). The
distinguishing characteristics of narrative identity in adults with features of
Borderline Personality Disorder: an empirical investigation. J. Pers. Disord. 26,
498–512. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2012.26.4.498
APA (American Psychiatric Association). (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edn. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric
Association.
Baillargeon, R., He, Z., Setoh, P., Scott, R. M., Sloane, S., and Yang, D. Y.-J. (2013).
“False-belief understanding and why it matters: the social-acting hypothesis,” in
Navigating the Social World, eds M. R. Banaji and S. A. Gelman (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press), 88–95.
Baillargeon, R., Setoh, P., Sloane, S., Jin, K., and Bian, L. (2014). “Infant
social cognition: psychological and sociomoral reasoning,” in The Cognitive
Neurosciences, eds M. S. Gazzaniga and G. R. Mangun (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 7–14.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I. (2001). The
“reading the mind in the eyes” test revised version: a study with normal
adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 42, 241–251. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00715
Carruthers, P. (2009a). How we know our own minds: the relationship
between mindreading and metacognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 32, 121–138. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X09000545
Carruthers, P. (2009b).Mindreading underlies metacognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 32,
164–176. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000831
Carruthers, P. (2011). The Opacity of Mind: The Cognitive Science of Self-
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2013). Mindreading in infancy. Mind Lang. 28, 141–172. doi:
10.1111/mila.12014
Carruthers, P., Fletcher, L., and Ritchie, B. (2012). The evolution of self-knowledge.
Philos. Topics 15, 13–37. doi: 10.5840/philtopics201240212
Dziobek, I., Fleck, S., Kalbe, E., Rogers, K., Hassenstab, J., Brand, M., et al. (2006).
Introducing MASC: A Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. J. Autism
Dev. Disord. 36, 623–636. doi: 10.1007/s10803-006-0107-0
Dziobek, I., Preissler, S., Grozdanovic, Z., Heuser, I., Heekeren, H. R., and
Roepke, S. (2011). Neuronal correlates of altered empathy, and social
cognition in borderline personality disorder. Neuroimage 15, 539–548. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.005
Fernyhough, C. (2009). What can we say about the inner experience of the young
child? Behav. Brain Sci. 32, 143–144. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000612
Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 62, 559–582. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.1
31702
Franzen, N., Hagenhoff, M., Baer, N., Schmidt, A., Mier, D., Sammer, G., et al.
(2011). Superior “theory of mind” in borderline personality disorder: an
analysis of interaction behavior in a virtual trust game. Psychiatry Res. 15,
224–233. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2010.11.012
Gergely, G., and Unoka, Z. (2008). “Attachment, affect-regulation and
mentalization,” in Mind to Mind: Infant Research, Neuroscience and
Psychoanalysis, eds E. L. Jurist, A. Slade, and S. Bergner (New York, NY:
Other Press), 50–87.
Habermas, T. (2011). Autobiographical reasoning: arguing and narrating from
a biographical perspective. New Dir. Child Adolesc. Dev. 131, 1–17. doi:
10.1002/cd.285
Hernik, M., Fearon, P., and Fonagy, P. (2009). There must be more to development
of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks. Behav. Brain
Sci. 32, 147–148. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0900065X
Jørgensen, C. R., Berntsen, D., Bech, M., Kjølbye, M., Bennedsen, B. E., and
Ramsgaard, S. B. (2012). Identity-related autobiographical memories and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1022
Guerini et al. Mentalization, attachment, and subjective identity
cultural life scripts in patients with Borderline Personality Disorder. Conscious.
Cogn. 21, 788–798. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.010
Linehan, M. M. (1995). Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder. New York,
NY: Guilford Press.
Lyons-Ruth, K., Yellin, C., Melnick, S., and Atwood, G. (2005). Expanding
the concept of unresolved mental states: hostile/helpless states of mind on
the Adult Attachment Interview are associated with disrupted mother-infant
communication and infant disorganization. Dev. Psychopathol. 17, 1–23. doi:
10.1017/S0954579405050017
Onishi, K. H., and Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants
understand false beliefs? Science 308, 255–258. doi: 10.1126/science.
1107621
Preißler, S., Dziobek, I., Ritter, K., Heekeren, H. R., and Roepke, S. (2010).
Social cognition in Borderline Personality Disorder: evidence for disturbed
recognition of the emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others. Front. Behav.
Neurosci. 4:182. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2010.00182
Saxe, R., and Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about people: the role of the
temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.”Neuroimage 19, 1835–1842. doi:
10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1
Scholl, B. J., and Leslie, A. M. (1999). Modularity, development and “Theory of
mind”.Mind Lang. 14, 131–153. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017. 00106
Van den Broeck, K., Claes, L., Pieters, G., and Raes, F. (2012). Memory
specificity in borderline personality disorder: associations with depression
and self-discrepancy. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 43, S51eS59. doi:
10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.02.001
Van den Broeck, K., Claes, L., Pieters, G., Hermans, D., and Raes, F.
(2015). “Overgeneral memory in borderline personality disorder,” in Clinical
Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory, eds L. A. Watson and D. Berntsen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 221–241.
Wilson, T. (2002). Strangers to Ourselves. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Guerini, Marraffa and Paloscia. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1022
